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Abstract 
This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. 
Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy 
regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is 
optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed 
bonds a much better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation 
risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds 
become a better store of value relative to indexed bonds. These results are robust to the PT 
target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that 
indexation is lagged is crucial. From a policy perspective, a key finding is that accounting for 
optimal indexation has important welfare implications for comparisons of IT and PT. 
Keywords: government debt, inflation risk, inflation targeting, price-level targeting. 
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1. Introduction 
Long-term contracts like government bonds and public pensions play an important role in 
many developed economies. Since contracts of this kind are often specified in nominal terms, 
unanticipated changes in inflation that are not reversed will lead to fluctuations in real wealth. 
These fluctuations are important for old generations because they rely on long-term contracts 
to fund their consumption in retirement. The magnitude of revaluations in long-term contracts 
due to unanticipated inflation depends crucially upon the amount of long run inflation risk in 
the economy. This observation motivates a comparison of the costs and benefits of inflation 
targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT) regimes. Under IT, unanticipated shocks to the 
price level are not reversed by policy, so there is base-level drift in the price level. 
Consequently, inflation risk rises with the forecast horizon.
2
 By contrast, PT offsets 
unanticipated shocks to inflation in order to return the price level to a target path which is 
known ex ante. As a result, long run inflation risk is largely eliminated under a PT regime.  
In this paper, optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under IT and PT 
regimes. Given that government debt accounts for a substantial fraction of net nominal wealth 
in developed economies (Dopeke and Schneider, 2006; Meh and Terajima, 2008), this 
analysis is important for comparing these two regimes. In recent years, both policymakers 
and academics have become interested in this comparison. Several papers have shown that 
PT offers short-term stabilisation benefits over IT when agents are forward-looking. Vestin 
(2006), for example, shows that in the standard New Keynesian model, PT reduces inflation 
variability for a given level of output gap variability if policy is discretionary. In the same 
model, the optimal commitment policy implies a stationary price level (Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler, 1999).
3
 In light of these results, the Bank of Canada recently conducted a detailed 
review of the costs and benefits of PT (see Bank of Canada, 2011).
4
 However, to the author’s 
knowledge, no paper has assessed optimal indexation of long-term nominal debt contracts 
under IT and PT in a DSGE model where long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an initial assessment of this kind. 
An overlapping generations (OG) model in the spirit of Diamond (1965) is calibrated to 
roughly match the UK economy. The model has three features that make it useful for 
investigating optimal indexation in an environment of long run inflation risk. First, long run 
inflation risk matters for social welfare since revaluations in the return on government debt 
due to unanticipated inflation are a source of consumption risk for old generations. In the 
model, long run inflation risk affects social welfare by two distinct channels: (i) variations in 
the real return on government debt lead to costly consumption variations for old generations; 
and (ii) a rise in long run inflation risk raises the risk premium the government pays on 
nominal debt and so requires higher taxes to maintain government spending. By contrast, 
only short-term inflation risk matters for social welfare in the standard New Keynesian model 
(Woodford, 2003). Second, the effects of optimal indexation on young and old generations 
can be assessed directly, hence providing useful information on the distributional effects of 
government debt policy under IT and PT regimes. Third, consistent with the standard OG 
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 That is, the price level follows a random walk. Inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon in this case 
because inflation between period t and t+k depends on the ratio of the price level in t+k to that in period t.  
3
 The issue of whether optimal policy in the New Keynesian model implies price stationarity is controversial. 
Negative results include Steinsson (2003), Levin et al. (2010) and Amano, Ambler and Shukayev (2012).  
4
 This work is surveyed in Ambler (2009), Crawford, Meh and Terajima (2009) and Bank of Canada (2011).   
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life-cycle model, each period in the model lasts 20 years. As a result, inflation risk and 
equilibrium asset prices can be modelled over a long horizon without introducing a large 
number of state variables. This feature of the model is crucial since a second-order 
approximation is needed to capture the full implications of inflation risk for social welfare,
5
 
making a numerical solution computationally-intensive.  
The main finding of the paper is that full indexation of government debt is optimal under IT, 
in stark contrast to PT where optimal indexation is substantially lower. Intuitively, despite the 
fact that the payoff on indexed bonds is subject to inflation risk due to a one-year indexation 
lag, return risk on nominal bonds is much higher since IT implies that cumulative inflation 
risk over a 20-year horizon is approximately 20 times that at a yearly horizon (due to base-
level drift). Under a PT regime, by contrast, long run inflation risk does not increase with the 
forecast horizon and so is reduced to annual magnitudes. As a result, nominal bonds become 
a much better store of value relative to indexed bonds and optimal indexation is substantially 
lower. The indexation lag is crucial for explaining the sharp reduction in optimal indexation 
because the substantial reduction in long run inflation risk under a PT regime means that even 
a one-year indexation lag is sufficient to make return risk on indexed bonds comparable to 
that on nominal bonds. Consequently, there is no clear-cut benefit to indexation from the 
point of view of consumption stabilisation or government finances under a PT regime. It is 
important to note, however, that if the assumption that indexation is lagged is dropped, full 
indexation is optimal under both IT and PT. 
In order to establish the main result, the analysis begins with a simple version of the model in 
which full indexation is optimal under IT and zero indexation is optimal under PT. Later 
sections then extend the model to more realistic settings and test sensitivity to calibration. 
Three different extensions are considered. First, if the price level is returned to its target path 
gradually over several years, optimal indexation remains somewhat lower under PT but rises 
to around 50 per cent at a 2-year target horizon, and around 75 per cent at a 4-year horizon. 
Second, optimal indexation is lower under a PT regime with imperfect credibility, but again 
the differential is narrowed somewhat: optimal indexation under PT rises to around 60 per 
cent under a regime with high credibility and 80 per cent under low credibility. The reason is 
that imperfect credibility raises the inflation risk premium on nominal government debt, 
because it reflects agents’ belief that policy may revert to IT where long run inflation risk is 
much higher. Consequently, it is more costly for the government to issue nominal debt, 
implying higher taxes and (hence) lower average consumption for the young. Third, the 
baseline case assumes yearly money supply shocks are uncorrelated over time. Moderate 
correlation of money supply shocks raises optimal indexation under PT to around 50 per cent, 
while full indexation remains optimal under IT because indexing with a lag is less costly if 
inflation is persistent. In addition, sensitivity analysis suggests that the result that optimal 
indexation is substantially lower under PT is robust to model calibration.  
An important finding from a policy perspective is that the potential long run welfare gains 
from PT are overstated substantially if indexation of government debt is held fixed across 
regimes at the current UK level. Indeed, the welfare gain from PT is reduced from around 
0.20 per cent of aggregate consumption to almost zero if indexation is optimised under both 
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 The reason is that in linear or log-linearised models there is ‘certainty equivalence’ – i.e. the coefficients of 
policy functions do not depend on risk (shock volatility). As pointed out by (Kim and Kim, 2003), failure to 
account for the effects of risk can lead to spurious welfare reversals. Since the model is solved using a second-
order perturbation method, it captures the implications of risk for endogenous variables in the model. 
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IT and PT. These results highlight the importance of accounting for optimal indexation of 
government debt when comparing IT and PT regimes. More generally, the results suggest 
that analyses of IT and PT may produce misleading conclusions if they assume that nominal 
indexation is fixed across monetary regimes.   
The analysis in this paper is directly related to two other strands of literature. The first is on 
the aggregate effects of unanticipated inflation. In a seminal paper, Doepke and Schneider 
(2006) document postwar nominal portfolios in the US and show that an unanticipated 
increase in inflation has substantial redistribution effects through revaluations of nominal 
assets and liabilities. Meh and Terajima (2008) later examined nominal portfolios in Canada. 
Building on these two papers, Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010) simulated aggregate and 
welfare effects from one-off episodes of unanticipated inflation in Canada under IT and PT in 
a quantitative OG model. They find that unanticipated inflation has greater redistribution 
effects under IT because the initial change in inflation is not reversed, so that long-term 
nominal contracts undergo substantial revaluations. Consequently, induced welfare losses are 
somewhat larger under IT. However, a limitation is that nominal portfolios remain fixed 
across monetary regimes in their analysis. As Meh et al. acknowledge, analysing how 
nominal portfolios change following implementation of PT may be important to reach more 
precise estimates of its aggregate and welfare effects. Since the current paper allows nominal 
portfolios to vary, it should provide additional insight into the aggregate and welfare effects 
of PT. It also provides a simple methodology for assessing optimal indexation that could 
potentially be extended to more realistic settings such as quantitative OG models.   
The paper is also related to research on optimal indexation of wage contracts. In a seminal 
paper, Gray (1976) showed that optimal indexation increases with the nominal-to-real 
volatility ratio. More recently, Minford, Nowell and Webb (2003) build a model in which 
households cannot access financial markets and have an incentive to insure against real wage 
fluctuations. To do so, they optimise indexation of wage contracts. They find that optimal 
indexation is lower under a regime that aims at price rather than inflation stability, because 
nominal wage contracts become relatively better real wage stabilisers. Subsequently, Amano, 
Ambler and Ireland (2007) showed that the same conclusion holds in a model with staggered 
cohorts of labour-differentiated wage-setters who have unrestricted access to financial 
markets. An important difference in this paper is that indexation of government bonds has 
direct implications for government finances via the inflation risk premium on nominal 
government debt.
6
 Since the government must satisfy its budget constraint, inflation risk has 
knock-on effects on households and social welfare that are not present under optimal 
indexation of wage contracts. This problem therefore speaks to the need for a general 
equilibrium analysis that takes into account the main effects of inflation risk, including those 
for government finances. This paper provides such an analysis. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model and 
monetary policy in the baseline case. In Section 4, the optimal indexation problem and its 
solution are discussed. Then, in Section 5, the model is calibrated. Section 6 reports the 
optimal indexation results from the baseline model and is followed in Section 7 by extensions 
and sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 8 concludes and discusses implications for policy.  
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 For a recent survey of the inflation risk premium, see Bekaert and Wang (2010). In the model that follows, 
indexed debt is risky and the inflation risk premium is defined as the expected difference between the real return 
on nominal bonds and the real return on indexed bonds. 
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2. Model 
The model is a version of Diamond’s (1965) model with capital and government bonds. It 
contains three sectors: a household sector, a government sector, and a sector devoted to 
production of a single output good. Each sector is described in detail below, starting with the 
household sector. This section also describes the aggregate resource constraint and explains 
how preferences of society are related to the preferences of individual generations. 
2.1 Consumers 
A simple overlapping generations (OG) model with generations that live for two periods is 
considered. Each generation is modelled as a representative consumer who inelastically 
supplies a unit of labour when young and retires when old, leaving no bequests. Let 
subscripts {Y, O} denote, respectively, the young and the old. Each period in the model lasts 
20 years. The number of generations born per period is constant and normalized to 1. The real 
wage income of each young generation is taxed by the government at a constant rate τ. Young 
agents’ after-tax wage income is allocated to four assets: indexed government bonds, bi; 
nominal government bonds, b
n
; capital, k; and fiat money, m.  
Each young generation consumes and chooses an optimal portfolio of assets z ≡ (k, bi, bn, m) 
which pays off in old age. Capital earns a real return r
k
,
 
which is taxed by the government at 
rate τk. Indexed bonds pay a risky real return ri as a result of a one-year indexation lag, and   
nominal bonds pay a risky real return r
n
. Nominal bonds are riskless but for unanticipated 
inflation over the holding horizon from youth to old age (i.e. 20 years). Consequently, the 
real return on nominal bonds is r
n
 = R/(1+π), where π is inflation between youth and old age 
and R is the nominal interest rate.
7
 Since indexed bonds are subject to a one-year indexation 
lag, they pay a real return r
i
 = r (1+ πind)/(1+π), where πind is the inflation rate that indexed 
bonds are linked to and r is the (ex ante) real interest rate. The interest rates R and r are 
endogenously determined and ensure that, for each bond, demand is equated to supply.  
Money pays a real return r
m 
=
 
1/(1+π). Positive money demand arises from the legal 
requirement that young agents hold real money balances of at least δ > 0, so that mt ≥ δ as in 
Champ and Freeman (1990). The main advantage of this constraint is that it provides a role 
for money without requiring that it offer explicit transactions services, so that any differential 
in optimal indexation under IT and PT can be attributed to the implications of these regimes 
for long run inflation risk and not the impact of monetary policy on transactions costs or ease 
of exchange.
  
The constraint binds with equality if Rt > 1 for all t, which is assumed to hold.
8
 
Hence we have that 
           ,tm  t        (1) 
 
                                                          
7
 Bond returns are not taxed as this enables the model to better match the ratio of long-term government debt to 
GDP and the investment-GDP ratio. It is worth noting that UK government bonds with a maturity of 5 years or 
longer are exempt from tax if they are held in an ISA; see the Debt Management Office (DMO) website.  
8
 This condition is proven in the Appendix. It was comfortably satisfied in numerical simulations because 
steady-state inflation is positive and the steady-state real interest rate exceeds 1.  
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The budget constraints faced by the generation born in period t are given by 
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where 0≤ v ≤1 is the share of indexed bonds in total bonds portfolio, b. 
Given the focus in this paper, it is important to use preferences that can match household 
attitudes to risk revealed in applied research. As is well known, standard CRRA preferences 
cannot match the risk-free rate and risk-premia as they imply that the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is the reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Consequently, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) preferences are used here. With these 
preferences, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion can be calibrated separately. In a recent paper, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) 
show that this feature enables an otherwise standard New Keynesian model to match the 10-
year term premium on nominal bonds without compromising its ability to fit key macro 
variables.   
Consumers solve a maximisation problem of the form 
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where 0 < β < 1, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and 1/(1–ε) is the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. 
The first-order conditions are summarized by the following Euler equations: 
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Here t
~  is the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint to that on the budget 
constraint of the young,
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 For a full derivation of consumers’ first-order conditions, see Section A of the Appendix. 
10
 The dating on R and r reflects the fact that these (ex ante) returns must clear the markets for nominal and 
indexed bonds at the time when bonds are purchased, that is, at the end of period t. Note that the inflation rate to 
which indexed bonds are linked is not equal to the previous period’s inflation rate because the indexation lag is 
one year, whereas each period in the model lasts 20 years. For the determination of π and πind, see Section 3. 
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2.2 Firms 
The production sector consists of a representative firm that produces output using a Cobb-
Douglas production function. The share of capital in output is equal to α and the labour share 
is equal to 1–α. The firm hires capital and labour in competitive markets to maximise current 
period profits. Total factor productivity, A, is stochastic and follows an AR(1) in logs.
11
  
The real wage and the return on capital are given by  
  ttt
k
ttt kAkryw )1(           (9) 
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2.3 Government 
The government performs three functions. First, to meet government spending commitments, 
it taxes wage income of the young at a constant rate τ > 0, and capital income of the old at a 
constant rate τk > 0. Second, it conducts monetary policy by committing to a money supply 
rule. Third, the government sets the total supply of government bonds and chooses the share 
of indexed government bonds to maximise social welfare, subject to the monetary policy 
regime in place. 
The government budget constraint is given by 
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The total supply of government bonds is b = b
i
 + b
n
, and the shares of indexed and nominal 
government bonds in the total bond portfolio are constant and equal to v and 1–v, 
respectively. Since the tax rates on wage income and capital are constant, it follows that τk = 
aτ for some constant a > 0, so that tax policy can be described by the single tax rate τ. The 
government sets the total supply of bonds to facilitate consumption smoothing between youth 
and old age. In particular, it chooses the total supply of government debt so that  
 Et (sdft+1) = β                    (12) 
where Et is the conditional expectations operator.  
The bond supply rule in (12) implies a steady-state real interest rate of 1/β and hence perfect 
consumption smoothing in the deterministic steady-state. Consequently, there is a degree of 
social insurance without the burden of modelling a social security system.  The government 
sets the nominal money supply according to an IT or PT rule. These policy rules are 
discussed in Section 3. The government sets the constant tax rate τ to ensure that it achieves a 
long run target ratio of government spending to output, or  
 E(gt/yt) = G* > 0                    (13) 
where E is the unconditional expectations operator.  
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 Long run productivity risk is included because the risk aversion coefficient is calibrated to match the 20-year 
Sharpe ratio on capital. Including long run real risk also ensures that the implications of indexation for 
consumption risk are not significantly overstated.  
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Although τ is constant over time, it will differ across IT and PT regimes because the level of 
long run inflation risk affects the average real return on money balances and the inflation risk 
premium on nominal government debt. It should thus be understood that the tax rate is 
regime-specific, though this dependence is suppressed in order to minimize notational 
burden. Taking into account the equilibrium conditions of the model and the requirement that 
τ be set so that E(gt/yt) = G*, the government chooses the share of indexed government bonds 
to maximise social welfare. The full details of the government’s optimal indexation problem 
are presented in Section 4.     
2.4 Aggregate resource constraint 
Capital depreciates fully within a period, an assumption which is empirically reasonable 
given that each period in the model lasts 20 years. It follows that investment in period t is it = 
kt+1. The economy’s aggregate resource constraint in period t is  
 ttOtYtt gkccy  1,,                   (14) 
where the sum of the first two terms on the right hand side is aggregate consumption. 
2.5 Social welfare 
Welfare is given by the discounted sum of lifetime utilities across all generations:
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where 0<ω<1 is the social discount factor, and E is the unconditional expectations operator. 
It is clear from (15) that the social discount factor ω will not affect optimal indexation. 
Consequently, the social discount factor can be left unspecified. 
 
3. Monetary Policy and inflation 
The government conducts monetary policy using money supply rules set yearly with annual 
inflation in mind.
13
 The government can commit to these rules but cannot control the money 
supply perfectly and so has imperfect control over inflation. In order to obtain money supply 
rules consistent with the 20-year horizon of the model, the implications of these rules are 
traced out over a 20-year horizon. This section first derives expressions for equilibrium 
inflation under IT and PT, before turning to the one-year-lagged measure of inflation to 
which indexed bonds are linked. In the discussion that follows, Mn  denotes the nominal 
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 This social welfare function ignores the utility of the initial old, but this does not affect the main results. 
13
 This assumption is more consistent with the policy horizon in practice and brings two additional advantages: 
(i) calibrating at a 20-year horizon is problematic given that IT has been in place for less than 20 years as part of 
an independent monetary policy regime, and (ii) the impact of a target horizon longer than one year is 
investigated as a robustness test, since proponents of PT argue that the short-term costs of undoing shocks to the 
price level could be diminished in this way (e.g. Gaspar, Smets and Vestin, 2007). This investigation is not 
possible with monetary policy rules that have a 20-year target horizon. 
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money stock at the end of year n, and εn is an IID-normal innovation in year n with mean zero 
and standard deviation σ.   
3.1 Inflation targeting (IT)  
Under IT, the yearly nominal money supply grows at the annual target inflation rate, π*, plus 
any deviation due to an exogenous yearly money supply innovation ε: 
   )1*)(1(1 nnn MM                                                                  (16) 
Substituting repeatedly for the previous year’s money supply, 
 
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It is clear from this equation that the IT money supply rule aims at a constant inflation target 
and does not attempt to offset past money supply shocks – i.e. ‘bygones are bygones’. Given 
that each period lasts 20 years and the nominal money supply is the end-of-year stock, the 
implied money supply rule in period t is  

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20
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j
tjtt MM                    (18) 
where the money innovations are indexed by j = 1,2,…,20 and Mt  ≡ Pt mt is the nominal 
money stock at the end of period t.  
By money market equilibrium Mt = Ptmt, where mt = δ by the legal requirement on cash 
holdings. Hence Mt/Mt-1= Pt/Pt-1 = 1+πt.  
Inflation is period t is therefore given by 
  
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,
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j
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It is clear from (19) that there is base-level drift. As a result, inflation risk accumulates over a 
20-year horizon. Note that this rule would stabilise inflation perfectly at the long-term 
inflation target (1+π*)20 in the absence of money supply innovations, consistent with annual 
inflation of π* every year. Finally, note that inflation expectations are anchored at target: 
20
1 *)1(1    ttE . 
Since indexed bonds are subject to a one-year indexation lag, the inflation rate to which 
indexed bond are linked is given by the one-year lagged value of (19): 
  

 
19
1
,1,20
20 )1()1(*)1(1
j
tjt
ind
t                             (20) 
Equation (20) shows that indexed inflation will covary strongly with actual inflation under 
IT: they have 19 of 20 shocks in common, with the difference accounted for by the one-year 
indexation lag. Consequently, indexed bonds will be excellent stabilisers of long run 
purchasing power under IT. This point is important for understanding the results that follow. 
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3.2 Price-level targeting (PT) 
Under PT, policy aims to stabilize the price level around a target price path whose slope is 
consistent with an annual inflation target of π*. The crucial difference relative to IT is that 
past deviations from the inflation target are offset to return the price level to target. The 
yearly money supply rule therefore includes a correction for the previous year’s innovation:14 
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where the second equality follows from repeated substitution for the previous money supply.  
Given that the nominal money supply is the end-of-year stock, this equation implies a period t 
money supply rule 
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Again, Mt/Mt-1= Pt/Pt-1 = 1+πt, so inflation is period t is given by 
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where ε20,t is the money supply innovation in year 20 of period t. 
Notice that the PT money supply rule prevents base-level drift: money supply innovations 
have a temporary impact on the price level. As a result, long run inflation risk is somewhat 
lower than under IT.
15
 Intuitively, inflation in period t depends on the money supply 
innovation in year 20 of period t because policy offsets innovations after one year and so 
cannot offset the innovation in year 20 until the first year of the next period. Inflation in 
period t also depends on the money supply innovation in year 20 of period t–1, because this 
should be offset in year 1 of period t to correct for the past deviation from the target price 
path. Since rational agents expect past deviations from the target price path to be offset, 
inflation expectations vary with the past money supply innovation according to: 
1
1,20
20
1 )1(*)1(1

  tttE  . 
Since indexed bonds are subject to a one-year indexation lag, the inflation rate to which 
indexed bond are linked is given by 
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 The intuition can be seen easily by taking logs: Mn ≈ Mn-1 + π* + εn  – εn-1. Mn  and εn are defined as above. 
15
 It can be shown that the unconditional variance of inflation is approximately 10 times higher under an IT 
regime. (See the Appendix) 
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In this case, the inflation rate to which indexed bonds are linked will not covary with actual 
inflation at all, since yearly innovations to the money supply are uncorrelated.
16
 As a result, 
indexed bonds will be a poor stabiliser of purchasing power under a PT regime. The key to 
this result is that, under PT, cumulative inflation over a 20-year horizon depends only on two 
yearly innovations – the money supply innovation in year 20 of the current period, and the 
money supply innovation from year 20 of the previous period (i.e. the innovation from 20 
years earlier) – because all innovations in intervening years have been offset by the end of 
period t in order to return the price level to its target path.  
The key point is that since indexed bonds have a maturity of 20 years, the one-year 
indexation lag implies indexation to a measure of 20-year inflation whose start date and end 
date are one year earlier than those for actual inflation. This will tend to make indexed 
inflation a poor measure of actual inflation because all changes in actual inflation in period t 
come from the innovations that hit the economy at the start and end of each 20 year period. 
Of course, indexed inflation under IT also ‘misses’ innovations at the start and end of the 
period, but the crucial difference is that base-level drift implies that cumulative 20-year 
inflation under IT depends on all the other shocks that occur during period t, and not just 
those at the start and end of the period.             
4. Optimal indexation 
The government chooses the indexation share that maximises social welfare subject to 
generational budget constraints, the economy’s aggregate resource constraint, consumers’ 
and firms’ first-order conditions, fiscal policy (i.e. the total bond supply equation  and the 
long run government spending target), and the monetary policy regime in place.  
The government’s optimal indexation problem can be stated as follows: 
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 This assumption is relaxed as a robustness test in Section 7. Allowing for correlation between yearly 
innovations does not overturn the main result unless innovations are strongly positively correlated. 
17
 Notice that we do not need to include the nominal money supply rules in this optimisation problem because, 
in conjunction with the binding constraint on cash holdings, they imply an equilibrium inflation rate under each 
regime (see Section 3 for the details).  
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The optimal indexation share that satisfies (25) is computed numerically. To do so, the model 
was solved using a second-order perturbation approximation in Dynare++. In particular, 
social welfare was computed for a discrete number of indexation shares in the interval [0,1]. 
This was achieved by looping over the parameter v in discrete steps in Dynare++, with the aid 
of an algorithm available on Wouter Den Haan’s webpage.18  
The problem in (25) is more complicated than might appear at first sight since the researcher 
must solve for an indexation share that maximises social welfare, subject to the constraint 
that (13) holds, which pins down a unique tax rate τ*. The optimal indexation share was 
therefore computed by simultaneously looping over v and τ in discrete steps in order to find: 
(1) the tax rate τ*(vk) such that (13) holds for each discrete value of the indexation share v1, 
v2,…, vK in the interval [0,1]; and (2) the indexation share v*(τ*(v*)) in the set {v1, v2,…, vK} 
that maximises social welfare. 
To understand the indexation results that follow, it is helpful to consider a second-order 
Taylor expansion of social welfare around the point ct,Y  = E[ct,Y ] and ct+1,O  = E[ct+1,O ]:
19
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where ])[],[(~ ,,,, OtOtYtYttt cEccEcuu  ; 
xx
tu
~ denotes the second derivative of tu
~  with 
respect to variable x, evaluated x at the point E[x]; and )(xabsx  . 
This expression shows that social welfare increases with mean consumption levels in youth 
and old age but falls, ceteris paribus, with the variance around these mean outcomes, due to 
risk-aversion. There is additionally a consumption covariance term which has a negative 
impact. However, since the correlation between consumption in youth and consumption in 
old age is fixed by the structure of consumer portfolios, we can say that this term will also 
depend upon the consumption variances.
20
 Consequently, any difference in optimal 
indexation under IT and PT must be driven by the impact of policy on mean consumption 
levels or the variances of consumption. The numerical analysis that follows therefore 
explains optimal indexation with reference to these means and variances.     
5. Calibration 
The model was calibrated to roughly match the UK economy since 1997. Free parameters are 
calibrated to match standard values in the literature. 
 
                                                          
18
 See http://www.wouterdenhaan.com/numerical/dynareprograms.htm 
19
 This expression makes use of the fact that, under stationarity, E[ct+1,O ] = E[ct,O ] and var[ct+1,O] = var[ct,O]. 
20
 This point follows since cov[x,y] = corr[x,y].(var[x])
1/2
(var[y])
1/2
. 
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5.1 Aggregate uncertainty 
The model contains two aggregate shocks: a money supply innovation and a total factor 
productivity (TFP) shock. Calibrating the money supply rules requires a standard deviation 
for the annual money supply innovation. This standard deviation was set at σ = 0.0105 to 
match the standard deviation of annual CPI inflation from 1997 to 2011 in data from the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS). This calibration should give the model a good chance of 
matching the amount of long run inflation risk that would be observed with typical price level 
shocks in an IT regime.
21, 22
    
The AR(1) productivity shock is also calibrated for a generational horizon using annual 
data.
23
 Productivity is thus given by 
 ttAmeanAt eAAA  1lnln)1(ln                                                                       (27) 
where et is a zero-mean IID innovation to productivity and ρA and σe are calibrated based on 
the 20-year properties implied by an annual AR(1) productivity process.  
In particular, if the AR(1) coefficient in the annual productivity process is ρ, the implied 
AR(1) coefficient at a 20-year horizon is ρA ≡ ρ
20
 and the implied 20-year innovation 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the annual innovation to productivity, 
multiplied by [(1 – ρ40)/(1 – ρ2)]1/2. A standard calibration based on the business cycle 
literature is ρ = 0.955 and the annual innovation standard deviation was set at 0.018 based on 
the standard deviation of annual UK TFP growth from 1998-2010 in ONS data. Hence          
ρA = 0.40 and σe = 0.0557. 
5.2 The indexation lag 
As noted, indexed government bonds have a one-year indexation lag in the model.  Up until 
September 2005, all index-linked gilts in the UK were indexed to the Retail Prices Index 
(RPI) with a lag of 8 months, but all index-linked gilts issued since this time have a 3-month 
lag. Consequently, both types of gilts are in existence today, with 3-month gilts accounting 
for 53 per cent of the index-linked gilts market as of March 2011 and 8-month gilts 
accounting for the remaining 47 per cent (DMO 2011, p. 10).
24
 The proportion of 8-month 
gilts in the market will fall over time as debt issued before September 2005 reaches maturity; 
in fact, real-time data suggests that around two-thirds of the current market is in index-linked 
gilts with a 3-month indexation lag, and one-third in old-style gilts with an 8-month 
indexation lag.
25
 Crucially, however, the main findings in the paper would not be overturned 
if the indexation lag was 3 months rather than 1 year, provided that it was assumed that 
shocks hit the economy at a quarterly frequency. The baseline assumption of an indexation 
                                                          
21
 Under IT, annualised inflation, (1+πt)
1/20
 has a standard deviation approximately equal to σ when π* ≈ 0.    
22
 The variance of actual inflation at a 20-year horizon cannot be used since IT was not adopted as part of an 
independent monetary policy regime until 1997.  
23
 Lungu and Minford (2006) also calibrate a TFP shock at a generational horizon with annual data.  
24
 These figures refer to the size of the market in uplifted nominal terms. 
25
 See the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) website. The data was accessed on 10 May 2013. 
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lag of one year is made primarily to keep down the number of shocks in the model in the IT 
case, hence making a second-order approximation of the model computationally feasible.           
5.3 Model parameters 
Preference parameters 
The parameter ε was set at –0.35, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
(EIS) of 0.74. This calibration is consistent with micro studies that estimate an EIS less than 
1. The discount factor β was set at 0.70, implying an annual discount factor of 0.982 and an 
annual risk-free real rate of 1.8 per cent per annum. The annual risk-free real rate was 
deliberately set below the average UK estimate of 2.9 per cent from 1965 to 2005 (Mills, 
2008) since matching a real rate this high gives an investment-GDP ratio somewhat lower 
than in the data. Finally, the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ was calibrated to match the 
Sharpe ratio on capital, E[r
k–rf]/std(rk–rf).26 The target value of 0.43 is based on 
Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), who estimate the Sharpe ratio using 20-year 
holding period returns on equity and bonds in the US. Accordingly, γ was set at15. 
Other model parameters 
The parameter α was set at 0.263, implying a share of capital income in GDP of 26.3 per 
cent. This value is on the low side of standard calibrations but helps the model to match a 
target ratio of long-term government bonds to GDP of around 10 per cent, which roughly 
matches the share of long-term government bonds in UK GDP over the past decade.
27
 The tax 
rate on capital was set at 2.3 times the income tax rate, that is, a = 2.3. A substantially higher 
tax rate on capital is consistent with UK data over the period 1970-2005: Angelopoulos, 
Malley and Phillippopoulos (2012) calculate that the average tax rate on capital was 0.44, 
compared to an average tax rate on labour of 0.27, implying that capital taxes should be 
roughly 1.6 times as high as labour taxes. The higher calibrated ratio of 2.3 enables the model 
to get close to a target ratio of government bonds to investment of 2/3.
28
   
There are four additional parameters that need to be calibrated. First, an annual inflation 
target enters both the IT and PT money supply rules. This target was set at 0.02, consistent 
with the 2 per cent UK inflation target for the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Second, real 
money balances are equal to δ by the legal requirement on cash holdings. The calibration sets 
δ = 0.015 so that money balances are around 3 per cent of steady-state GDP in the model, 
consistent with annual UK data on notes and coins (ONS 2011, Table 1). Third, the long run 
government spending to GDP target, G*, was set at 0.11 since this implies a tax rate τ in the 
model solution such that government bonds and investment have plausible GDP shares. 
5.4 Steady-state solution and key ratios 
This section discusses the performance of the calibrated model against target ratios. In the 
model, investment equals the capital stock since there is full depreciation. The UK 
investment-GDP ratio has been close to 15 per cent over the past decade (ONS 2012, Table 
                                                          
26
 Returns are annualised here. The Sharpe ratio was computed using the after-tax return on capital.  
27
 See ONS (2011) and historical data available on the Debt Management Office (DMO) website. 
28
 This figure was reached by dividing the target ratio of government bonds to GDP of 0.10 by a target ratio of 
investment to GDP of 0.15 (see Section 5.4). 
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1.2) and over the same period the consumption share was around 65 per cent, implying target 
ratios of 0.15 and 0.65. Turning to government debt, the bonds-GDP ratio has fluctuated 
somewhat over the past decade but has averaged around one-third (ONS 2011, Table 1.1D). 
Together with a 2005 share of long-term government debt in total government debt of around 
30 per cent,
29
 this figure implies a target long-term government bonds to GDP ratio of around 
0.1. Table 1 shows that the model does fairly well against target ratios.
30
 
 
Table 1 – Target versus model ratios 
Ratio Target Model  Definition 
b/y 0.10 0.11 Long-term bonds/GDP 
i/y (=k/y) 0.15 0.14 Investment/GDP 
b/i 0.67 0.79 Long-term bonds/Investment 
(cY + cO) /y 0.65 0.75 Aggregate consumption/GDP 
E[r
k–rf]/std(rk–rf) 0.43 0.40 Sharpe ratio 
m/y 0.03 0.03 Notes and Coins/GDP 
 
 
6. Results 
The model was solved using a second-order perturbation approximation in Dynare++ 
(Julliard, 2001), with the optimal indexation share computed as described in Section 4. To 
determine optimal indexation, 100 simulations of length 1100 periods were run, with the first 
100 periods of each disregarded to randomise initial conditions. Hence, a total of 100,000 
simulated values were used to compute unconditional moments and social welfare for each 
indexation share. In this section, results are reported for the baseline model described above.   
6.1 The baseline model 
This section first investigates optimal indexation under inflation targeting (IT), before turning 
to the price-level targeting (PT) case. Optimal indexation is compared under IT and PT and 
the implications for welfare comparisons of these regimes are discussed.  
 
 
                                                          
29
 See historical data on the DMO website. The DMO classifies gilts as ‘long-term’ if maturity exceeds 15 years. 
30
 The model overshoots the target ratio of long-term government bonds to GDP, but this can be justified by the 
presence of substantial unfunded public sector and state pension liabilities that play a similar role to long-term 
government bonds. The estimated annual cost of unfunded UK public sector pensions in 2007-8 was 1.5 per cent 
of GDP (Table 2.6, Public Sector Pensions Commission 2010) and Müller et al. (2009) report annual 
expenditure on social security pensions of 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2006. The Basic and Additional state pensions 
in the UK are indexed under a triple-lock system (highest of earnings, CPI inflation with an 8-month lag or 2.5 
per cent), while public sector pensions are indexed to CPI inflation with an 8-month lag.   
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Inflation targeting (IT) 
Figures 1 and 2 report the baseline results under IT:  
Fig 1 – Indexation and social welfare under IT 
 
Fig 2 – Factors driving optimal indexation (IT) 
 
As can be seen from Fig 1, social welfare is maximised when the government issues only 
indexed government debt – i.e. full indexation of 100 per cent is optimal.  Fig. 2 sheds light 
on why this is the case. The key factor driving the full indexation result is old agents’ 
consumption risk, which is minimised under full indexation. Old generations’ consumption 
risk is crucial for two reasons: first, it has a direct impact on social welfare because 
consumers are risk-averse; second, higher consumption risk implies a higher inflation risk 
premium,
31
 so that higher taxes are necessary to meet the long run government spending 
target. In turn, a rise in taxes implies lower mean consumption by the young. Intuitively, old 
agents’ consumption risk is minimised by full indexation of government debt because, as 
explained in Section 3.1, indexed government debt provides far better insurance against 
unanticipated inflation than nominal debt and so commands a much lower risk premium in 
equilibrium. Indeed, since cumulative inflation risk over 20 years is (approximately) 20 times 
                                                          
31
 The inflation risk premium is defined as the differential between the expected real return on an indexed bond 
and the expected real return on an indexed bond – i.e. E(rn) – E(ri). Graphs report the annualised risk premium. 
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that at a yearly horizon under IT due to base-level drift, the 1-year indexation lag on indexed 
debt exposes bondholders to only 1 year of inflation risk, as compared to exposure to the full 
20 years in the case of nominal government debt.   
Since consumption risk is minimised under full indexation, both the inflation risk premium 
and taxes are minimised with full indexation. The latter means that average consumption by 
the young is maximised. Consequently, the young gain from higher average consumption 
under full indexation, while the old gain directly from a substantial reduction in consumption 
risk (and indirectly from a lower capital tax rate). Indeed, although average consumption by 
the old falls as indexation is increased (because a higher inflation risk premium raises the 
average real return paid on nominal government debt) and consumption risk for the young 
rises marginally, the rise in average consumption by the young and the reduction in 
consumption risk for the old are sufficient to ensure social welfare rises under full indexation. 
  
Price-level targeting (PT) 
Figures 3 and 4 report the baseline results under PT: 
 
Fig 3 – Indexation and social welfare under PT 
 
Fig 4 – Factors driving optimal indexation (PT) 
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In stark contrast to the IT case, zero indexation of government debt is optimal under PT.     
Figure 4 shows that this is because indexed bonds are more risky than nominal bonds, so that 
consumption risk for the old is minimised at close to zero indexation.  The riskiness of 
indexed government debt shows itself clearly in a negative inflation risk premium on nominal 
bonds, in stark contrast to the IT case. As a result, the relationship between taxes and 
indexation is positive under PT, so that average consumption by the young is maximised 
under zero indexation. In short, the main factors driving optimal indexation work in exactly 
the opposite direction under PT, because nominal government debt is a better store of value 
than indexed debt and so commands a lower risk premium. The impact of the one-year 
indexation lag on indexed government debt is crucial for understanding this result. Indeed, 
the relatively poor performance of indexed debt under PT is driven solely by the indexation 
lag, since full indexation is optimal under both IT and PT in the absence of an indexation lag. 
The one-year indexation lag is crucial because cumulative inflation risk over a 20-year 
horizon is reduced to yearly levels, due to the absence of base-level drift under PT. This 
makes nominal government bonds rather effective stabilisers of long run purchasing power, 
while indexed bonds ‘miss’ completely the yearly shocks that matter for 20-year inflation 
because they are indexed with a one-year lag. The results also highlight clearly the 
importance of allowing for changes in indexation of government debt when evaluating 
consumption risk and social welfare. In particular, changes in indexation are associated with 
much larger changes in consumption risk and social welfare under an IT regime – as can be 
seen clearly by comparing Figures 1 to 4. Consequently, if indexation is fixed at 20 per cent 
(which is close to the current share of index-linked gilts in the UK) there is an implied 
welfare gain from PT equivalent to 0.20 per cent of aggregate consumption.
32
 But when 
indexation is optimised under both regimes, this welfare gain is reduced to essentially zero.  
7. Extensions and robustness 
The baseline model makes a number of simplifying assumptions, including a PT target 
horizon of one year (i.e. all inflationary shocks are undone after one year);
33
 perfect 
credibility of PT; and uncorrelated yearly money supply innovations. In this section, each of 
these assumptions is relaxed. Sensitivity to calibrated values is also discussed. 
7.1 A flexible target horizon under PT 
Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) argue that the short-term stabilization costs of undoing price 
level shocks could be reduced by restoring the price level to its target path gradually 
following deviations from target. The analysis in this section therefore investigates optimal 
indexation under a PT regime that returns the price level to target over several years, in 
contrast to the maintained assumption of one year in the baseline case. To do so, the target 
horizon in the PT money supply rule is varied from 1 to 4 years. 
For the general case where the price level is returned to target in uniform steps over H years, 
the yearly money supply rule is as follows: 
                                                          
32
 The welfare gain (or loss) from PT was computed as the fractional increase in aggregate consumption, λ, 
necessary to equate social welfare under IT with that under PT, i.e. SW 
IT
(1+λ)1 – γ = SW PT. 
33
 Under IT, the target horizon is irrelevant because base-level drift means that shocks to inflation are not offset 
by policy.  
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Note that innovations up to H years old enter in the denominator of this rule because each is 
offset only after H years in total, with a fraction 1/H offset each year.  
By substitution, (28) implies that: 
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Inflation is therefore given by 
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Consider setting H = 2. In this case, only money supply shocks in years 19 and 20 of period t 
matter for inflation because shocks in years 1 to 18 will have been offset fully by the end of 
the period t (i.e. by year 20), since the target horizon is 2 years. Shocks in years 19 and 20 
from the previous period enter in the denominator because these shocks will not have been 
offset before the end of period t–1 and so must be offset in period t to return the price level to 
its target path.  
Since the inflation rate to which indexed bonds are linked is the one-year lagged value of 
actual inflation, indexed inflation for a target horizon of H years is now given by 
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Equation (31) shows that a gradual return of the price level to target has two effects. First, 
returning the price level to target gradually raises long run inflation risk because the price 
level is allowed to deviate from its target path for longer. Second, a PT target horizon longer 
than one year implies that actual and indexed inflation are positively correlated, because past 
deviations from the target price path are ‘smoothed’ back to target over several years. Hence 
indexed bonds become better stabilisers purchasing power relative to indexed bonds. 
The results for PT target horizons of 1 to 4 years are reported in Figure 5. Optimal indexation 
rises with the target horizon, from zero when H = 1 (the baseline case), to 44 per cent when   
H = 2, and up to 76 per cent when H = 4. The reason is that, as noted above, a target longer 
than one year implies that actual and indexed inflation are positively correlated, so that 
indexed bonds become better stabilisers of purchasing power relative to nominal bonds. This 
relative reduction in risk is reflected in a positive inflation risk premium on nominal bonds,
34
 
which implies that taxes can be reduced – and hence average consumption by the young 
increased – by issuing some indexed bonds. This rise in average consumption for the young is 
                                                          
34
 However, the inflation risk premium turns negative at relatively high indexation shares, which helps explain 
why full indexation is not optimal.  
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crucial for social welfare because it dominates the fall in average consumption for the old, 
and is not discounted in lifetime utility unlike the latter. 
Fig 5 – Optimal indexation and the target horizon of policy (PT) 
 
 
7.2 Imperfect credibility of PT 
The argument that PT would be imperfectly credible is appealing since a regime of this kind 
has not been adopted in recent history. As such, imperfect credibility was an important 
consideration in the Bank of Canada’s deliberations about the relative merits of PT (Bank of 
Canada, 2011).  
Imperfect credibility of PT has been studied by Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) and Masson 
and Shukayev (2011). Gaspar et al. argue that PT would experience an initial period of 
imperfect credibility when agents would learn about the workings of the new regime. They 
use a New Keynesian model with learning and find that an initial period of imperfect 
credibility is sufficient to turn the net welfare gains from PT negative if agents are slow to 
learn, because expectations become backward-looking. Masson and Shukayev build a New 
Keynesian model where PT operates with an ‘escape clause’, such that sufficiently large 
shocks lead to rebasing of the target price path. They show that there are two stable 
equilibria: one with a low probability of rebasing, and one with a high probability. 
Consequently, both high and low credibility PT regimes are long run equilibrium outcomes. 
In contrast to these two papers, the analysis in this section concentrates on the impact of 
imperfect credibility through the long run inflation risk channel. The analysis also differs in 
that the model is non-linear, so that imperfect credibility influences aggregate outcomes 
through the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds, as well as by the inflation expectations 
channel.  
In order to model imperfect credibility, it is assumed that young agents assign a constant 
probability pIT  to the event that that monetary policy will switch back to IT in the next period. 
Accordingly, agents assign a constant probability 1– pIT to the event that the current PT 
regime will remain in place next period. The probability pIT  can thus be taken as a measure of 
credibility, with pIT  = 0 corresponding to the perfect credibility case (the baseline case 
analysed above). It is important to note that although agents assign a positive probability to 
reversions to IT, no such reversions actually occur in equilibrium. Hence the analysis is one 
of imperfect credibility and not regime switching. 
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Given beliefs over regimes s = {IT, PT} and period-t information Ωt, lifetime utility is 
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The first-order conditions are given by the following Euler equations:
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where SDFt+1(s) ≡ sdft+1(s)/(1+πt+1(s)), 
k
s  is the tax rate on capital in regime s, and 
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The model was simulated for two different values of pIT : 0.1 and 0.3. These values represent 
fixed beliefs that policy will revert to IT next period with 10 and 30 per cent probability. The 
former is interpreted as a situation where PT has high credibility and the latter as a situation 
where it has low credibility. The results for these two cases are reported in Figures 6 and 7. 
 
Fig 6 – Indexation and social welfare under imperfect credibility of PT 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 The government is assumed to set the total bond supply so that the conditionally expected stochastic discount 
factor across regimes is equal to β (a natural extension of (12)), implying that 1 = βr in the deterministic steady-
state. The first-order conditions are derived in the Appendix. Note that first-order condition for capital holdings 
reflects agents’ belief that if there were a change in regime back to IT, the long run IT tax rate would apply. 
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Fig 7 – Factors driving optimal indexation (PT) 
 
Optimal indexation is somewhat higher than in the baseline model, at around 60 per cent 
under high credibility and 80 per cent under low credibility. Optimal indexation rises because 
imperfect credibility increases the inflation risk premium on nominal government debt. The 
reason is that agents’ expectations reflect their belief that policy may revert to the high 
inflation risk IT regime under which indexed debt is a far better store of value than nominal 
debt. In turn, this increase in the inflation risk premium makes it more costly (in real terms) 
to issue nominal rather than indexed government debt, implying higher taxes to meet the long 
run government spending target and lower average consumption for the young. An interior 
solution for optimal indexation balances the welfare loss from this increase in taxes against 
the welfare gain from the fact that nominal government debt stabilises old age consumption 
more effectively than indexed debt under PT.  
Intuitively, the level of indexation is higher under low credibility because there is a larger rise 
in the inflation risk premium, so that the increase in taxes necessary to meet the long run 
government spending target is higher. Hence, while the welfare loss and welfare gain referred 
to above are of roughly equal magnitude under high credibility, a situation of low credibility 
shifts the balance in favour of indexed government debt because it raises the welfare loss 
from higher taxes whilst leaving the welfare gain side of the equation unaffected.
36
        
7.3 Correlated shocks to inflation 
The baseline model assumes that yearly money supply innovations are uncorrelated. As 
discussed in Section 6, this assumption is likely to be important for optimal indexation 
because it implies that current and past shocks to inflation are uncorrelated, so that indexation 
to lagged inflation is more costly than it would under positive autocorrelation. In this section, 
the assumption of uncorrelated innovations is relaxed. In particular, it is assumed that the 
money supply innovation in any given year n of period t is positively correlated with the 
innovation in the previous year n–1. The correlation was set at 0.5 because empirical 
evidence suggests inflation persistence has fallen to moderate levels in the Great Moderation, 
in contrast to much of the postwar period (e.g. Benati, 2008; Minford et al. 2009).       
                                                          
36
 The latter is unchanged because it depends only on actual policy (i.e. PT) and not consumers’ beliefs about 
which regime will be in place next period. 
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Since allowing for correlated innovations leaves optimal indexation unchanged under IT, the 
focus in this section is on the impact of correlated innovations under PT. More specifically, 
the question of interest is whether correlated innovations close substantially the optimal 
indexation differential between IT and PT. The results are reported in Figures 8 and 9. 
Fig 8 – Indexation and social welfare (PT) 
 
Fig 9 – Factors driving optimal indexation (PT) 
 
 
Optimal indexation under PT is somewhat higher than in the baseline case at 48 per cent. 
Intuitively, correlated money supply innovations make indexed bonds a better store of value 
as compared to nominal bonds, so that consumption risk in old age is now minimised at 
around 50 per cent indexation, rather than at zero as in the baseline case. The fall in riskiness 
of indexed bonds is reflected directly in the inflation risk premium – it is now positive up to 
an indexation share of almost 50 per cent, so that the taxes necessary to meet the government 
spending target are minimised, and average consumption by the young maximised, at an 
indexation share of around 50 per cent. Since an indexation share of around 50 per cent 
maximises mean consumption by the young and minimises consumption risk for the old, it is 
intuitive that the optimal indexation share is close to 50 per cent.  
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7.4 Calibration sensitivity analysis  
This final subsection is concerned with sensitivity of the baseline result to calibrated 
parameters. In particular, the baseline model was solved for the optimal indexation share 
under ‘high’ and ‘low’ calibrations of model parameters, including shock standard deviations. 
The main result was not overturned in any of these sensitivity tests.
37
 Consequently, we can 
say that this finding is robust to (i) more realistic versions of the model, and (ii) alternative 
calibrations of the baseline model. 
 
8. Conclusion  
This paper has investigated optimal indexation of long-term government debt under inflation 
targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). These two monetary regimes have very different 
long run implications. Under IT, inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon since there 
is base-level drift in the price level. By contrast, a PT regime rules out base-level drift. As a 
result, long run inflation risk is largely eliminated under PT, with the implication that the 
purchasing power of nominal assets is maintained over long horizons. Optimal indexation 
was studied in the context of a simple overlapping generations (OG) model that was roughly 
calibrated to match the UK economy. The model is well-suited for this task because each 
period lasts 20 years and long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. In order to capture 
base-level drift under IT – and its absence under PT – the standard OG model was augmented 
to include money supply shocks at a yearly horizon. 
 
The main finding is that when indexed government debt is subject to a one-year indexation 
lag, optimal indexation is substantially lower under PT. In order to demonstrate this result, 
the analysis began with a simple version of the model in which full indexation in optimal 
under IT, and zero indexation is optimal under PT. Intuitively, return risk on long-term 
nominal bonds is somewhat higher than on indexed debt under IT, since cumulative inflation 
risk over a 20-year horizon is approximately 20 times that at a yearly horizon (due to base-
level drift), while indexed bonds are subject to only one year’s worth of inflation risk. Under 
a PT regime, by contrast, 20-year inflation risk is lowered to annual magnitudes, and so is 
similar to the one year’s worth of inflation risk to which the return on indexed bonds is 
exposed. However, indexed bonds are worse stabilisers of purchasing power than nominal 
bonds under PT because actual and lagged inflation are entirely uncorrelated when money 
supply innovations are white noise. As a result, there is no clear-cut benefit to indexation 
from the point of view of consumption stabilisation or government finances under a PT 
regime. 
 
The result that optimal indexation is substantially lower under PT holds in more realistic 
versions of the model in which the PT target horizon exceeds one year; where PT is 
imperfectly credible; and where yearly money innovations are serially correlated, so that 
indexing with a one-year lag is less costly than in the baseline case. In each case the 
differential between optimal indexation under IT and PT is closed by 50 per cent or more, 
indicating that moderate levels of indexation become optimal under PT. In the case of a low 
credibility PT regime there is quite a large impact: optimal indexation rises to 80 per cent, 
since the belief that policy may revert to IT next period (where long run inflation risk is much 
higher) raises the inflation risk premium on nominal government debt substantially. 
                                                          
37
 The results are available from the author on request and may be included in a separate web appendix. 
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Sensitivity analysis on model parameters does not overturn the main result, but it is important 
to note that relaxing the assumption that indexation is lagged makes full indexation of 
government debt optimal under both IT and PT.  
An additional finding is that the long run welfare gains from PT are overstated non-trivially if 
indexation of government debt is held fixed under both regimes at the current UK level. 
Therefore, changes in the structure of the government bond portfolio have potentially 
important welfare implications for comparing IT and PT regimes. Policymakers and 
researchers should bear this in mind when assessing the case for a change in regime from IT 
to PT. More generally, the results in this paper suggest that it may be important to account for 
changes in the structure of long run nominal portfolios when comparing IT and PT regimes.  
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Technical appendix (Not for publication) 
Section 1 – Derivations and proofs 
A – Derivation of first-order conditions in the baseline case 
Consumers solve a maximisation problem of the form 
 
 
 




 



 









1
1
1
,1,
 , , 1
1
  
,1,
max OttYtt
czc
cEcu
OttYt
 subject to   
                                             (A1) 
t
n
t
i
tttYt mbbkwc   111, )1(    (Budget constraint of young)                              
t
m
t
n
t
n
t
i
t
i
tt
k
t
k
Ot mrbrbrkrc 1111111,1 )1(     (Budget constraint of old)                    
tm       (Cash constraint) 
where ),,,( 111 t
n
t
i
ttt mbbkz   is the vector of assets chosen by households.   
The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows: 













)())1( (
))1( (
,11111111,1
,111,


ttOtt
m
t
n
t
n
t
i
t
i
tt
k
t
k
Ot
Ytt
n
t
i
tttYtt
tt
mcmrbrbrkr
cmbbkwu
EL                  (A2) 
First-order conditions are as follows: 
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By substitution, this system can be reduced to four Euler equations: 
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The partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
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Dividing (A4) by (A3) gives 
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B – The binding legal constraint on money holdings 
It is shown in this section that the constraint binds with strict equality if the gross money return on a 
nominal bond exceeds 1.  
Proposition: The constraint binds with strict equality when Rt > 1 
Proof. 
By equations (A7) and (A9), the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint is given by 
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since the nominal yield on nominal government bonds, Rt, is known at the end of period t. 
 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with μt are as follows: 
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The second condition in (B3) is the complementary slackness condition. It implies that the cash 
constraint will be strictly binding iff μt > 0 for all t.  
Dividing (B2) by ][][1 1111
m
tttt
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Since λt,Y > 0 (as the budget constraint of the young will always hold with equality), it follows that μt > 
0 iff Rt > 1 for all t.      Q.E.D. 
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C – Approximate analytical expressions for long run inflation risk under IT and PT 
This appendix derives approximate expressions for the inflation variance under IT and PT. 
Inflation Targeting (IT) 
Under IT, inflation is period t is given by 
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where εj,t are IID-normal innovations with mean zero and variance σ
2
. 
Since a general non-linear function g(ε) (where ε is a vector of variables) can be approximated by 
var(g(ε)) ≈ ∑[gj’(μ)]
2
var(εj) using the ‘Delta method’ (where μ is the unconditional mean of the vector 
ε, and gj’ is the first derivative of g(ε) with respect to variable εj), the inflation variance under IT can 
be approximated as follows: 
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Price-level targeting (PT) 
Under PT, inflation in period t is given by 
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where ε30,t and ε30,t-1 are IID-normal innovations with mean zero and variance σ
2
. 
Using the same approximation method as above, the inflation variance under PT is given by 
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Hence the unconditional variance of inflation under IT is (approx.) 10 times that under PT. 
 
D – First-order conditions under imperfect credibility 
In this case, consumers solve the following problem where s = {IT, PT}: 
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where ]|[ )(1 tstXE   is the expectation of Xt+1 in regime s, conditional upon period-t information, Ωt. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows: 
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First-order conditions are as follows: 
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By substitution, this system can be reduced to four Euler equations: 
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The partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
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where  
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Dividing (D8) by (D7) gives 
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where SDFt+1(s) ≡ sdft+1(s)/(1+πt+1(s)) and Yttt ,
~   . 
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